























notFinding an empirically realistic model of pricing dynamics is of cruci
importance for the conduct of monetary policy. One reason is obvio
central banks cannot be expected to maintain a reliable and stable m
economic environment if their deliberations are not guided by an accu
conception of the effects of their actions. But the questions addressed a
conference are significant for other reasons as well. For example, the w
which prices are set has important consequences for the central b
stabilization objectives if it wishes to maximize social welfare. Pri
stability matters for welfare because of the way prices are adjuste
response to changing conditions. In the textbook world of perfectly flexi
wages and prices, maintaining stable purchasing power of the uni
account would be of little significance. It then follows as well that the se
in which it is desirable for inflation to be stabilized will depend on ho
inflation dynamics are related to real distortions.
As we shall see, the nature of inflation dynamics matters for several asp
of the optimal conduct of monetary policy. First, alternative pricing mod
can lead to different views of the optimal long-run inflation target. Seco
they can imply different perspectives of the optimal dynamic response
inflation to disturbances, and hence to different views of the degree to w
temporary departures from the long-run target should be allowed. A
finally, alternative models can change the form of the targeting rule to wh
a central bank should commit itself to bring about those optimal respon
to disturbances, while guaranteeing the desired long-run average ra
inflation. These aspects demonstrate that the way prices are set should
the nature of a central bank’s policy objectives and commitments, and
































03,I shall illustrate these points in a simple example drawn from recent deb
on the correct empirical specification of the aggregate-supply relations
To do so, I shall compare specifications that differ in the degree of infla
inertia that they imply. A straightforward way of incorporating inertia in
the dynamics of inflation has been proposed by Christiano, Eichenba
and Evans (2001) and used in the empirical models of Smets and Wo
(2002), Altig et al. (2002), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Sbordone (200
and Giannoni and Woodford (2003). In this extension of the standard C
model of staggered pricing, prices do not remain fixed between the ran
occasions on which they are reoptimized. The log price of a goodi in period
t can be expressed as
,
where is a good-specific base price, and the coefficient
indicates the degree of indexation of prices to the (lagged) general p
index . The base price remains fixed between the random occasion
which it is reoptimized; thus, in periods when no reconsideration of the b
price occurs, the price of goodi increases by fraction of the lagged overa
rate of inflation. (The lag is presumably attributed to lags in the availabi
of data on the aggregate price index.) The base price is reset at ran
intervals to the level that maximizes expected discounted profits at that ti
As shown in Woodford (2003, chapter 3), this leads to an aggregate-su
relationship of the form
, (1)
where is the inflation rate (change in the price index ), is an outp
gap measure, is the discount factor, the coefficient
depends on both the frequency with which prices are re-optimized and
degree of real rigidity, and is an exogenous cost-push shock. Note
when , this reduces to the familiar New Keynesian Phillips cur
considered in several papers at this conference. Furthermore, the in
specification that results when is closely related to the hybrid mo
of Galí and Gertler (1999), also considered in extensive recent empi
literature, though the microeconomic foundations proposed by these au
are slightly different. Finally, in the limiting case that , equation (1)
essentially the form of aggregate-supply relationship proposed by Fu
and Moore (1995), on the basis of different micro-foundations and fit to U
data in a number of studies.
When we consider the goals of monetary stabilization policy, what are
consequences of the estimated value of , which indicates the importan
lagged inflation as a determinant of current inflation? Woodford (20
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runchapter 6) shows that in a model with staggered pricing of the kind
described, maximization of the expected utility of the representa
household is equivalent (up to a quadratic approximation) to minimiza
of the expected discounted value of a loss function of the form
, (2)
if one abstracts from monetary frictions, where are functio
of model parameters.
Thus, the appropriate stabilization objective with regard to inflation is
stabilization of the rate of inflation, but rather of . The reason
simple: in this model, inflation results in real distortions owing to the fa
that the prices of different goods are not adjusted in a perfectly synchron
fashion, and this results in price misalignments. The distortion is minimi
by a current inflation rate equal to , which is the rate of automa
increases in the prices that are not reoptimized in periodt. Inflation occurs at
this rate when conditions are such that reoptimizing firms choose a ra
price increase equal to , the rate at which their prices would h
increased had they not reoptimized, and this is the case in which the fac
some firms reoptimize while others do not does not increase the
alignment of prices. Note in the Fuhrer-Moore case that it is only the rat
inflation accelerationthat matters for welfare, and not the absolute rate
inflation at all (abstracting from monetary frictions).
If the model is extended to allow for monetary frictions (and hence
positive demand for base money despite its being dominated in rat
return), the appropriate welfare-theoretic loss function (2) takes the m
general form
, (3)
where depends on the size of the monetary frictions, and is
interest rate (if any) paid on base money. When , the absolute rat
inflation is relevant to welfare even when , since the long-run aver
nominal interest rate will depend on the long-run average rate of inflat
Suppose, for example, that interest rates are related to inflation and
activity through the log-linear Euler equation
(4)
of the basic neo-Wicksellian model presented in Woodford (2003, cha
4), where represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
is the (exogenously varying) natural rate of interest. The long-
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thisaverage rates of interest and inflation must therefore satisfy the Fi
relationship
,
where is the long-run average value of the natural rate
interest.
I now turn from the appropriate loss function, describing the objectives
monetary policy, to the characterization of the optimal equilibrium paths
inflation and other variables. The first concern relates to the optimal lo
run inflation target. Let us consider the problem of choosing a path for
inflation rate, under commitment, from some date onward in the c
where there are no random disturbances ( at all times). T
amounts to choosing a sequence to minimize the discounted su
losses (equation 3), if the associated paths of the output gap and the in
rate are determined by equations (1) and (4). One can show that the op
sequence converges asymptotically to a constant long-run inflation targ
To a first-order approximation (adequate in the case of small eno
disturbances), this is also the long-run average value of inflation unde
optimal state-contingent commitment in the presence of rand
disturbances.
In the case of standard Calvo pricing , the optimal long-run inflati
target is given by
, (5)




which is the usual Friedman rule: bring about a rate of deflation where
interest rate differential between the monetary base and other riskless s
term nominal assets is eliminated. Instead, in the “cashless” limit of
economy with negligible monetary frictions , the optimal inflatio
target reduces to
1. In the case of flexible prices, the direct distortions associated with inflation disap
Because I have normalized the term in equation (3) with a coefficient of 1,
corresponds to infinitely large values for  and .
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When monetary frictions and sticky prices coexist (the case of finite posi
), the optimal inflation target lies between these extremes.2
When we allow for inflation inertia , matters are more complex. T
optimal inflation target is given by
,
generalizing equation (5). Note that a larger means a lower opti
inflation target. Indeed, in the limiting case that , the Friedman r
(equation 6) is optimal regardless of the size of . As noted above,
reason is that distortions resulting from imperfect synchronization of p
changes depend on the rate of inflation acceleration, and not on the abs
rate of inflation. Any constant long-run inflation rate is therefore equa
good from that point of view, and it is only the minimization of th
distortions associated with a positive opportunity cost of holding money
matters in the determination of .
One’s belief about the empirically realistic value of also has import
consequences for the optimal responses to random shocks. Conside
optimal response to a transitory, unforecastable cost-push shock , u
an optimal state-contingent commitment. In the case of a small eno
shock, the optimal responses (per unit unexpected in at the
corresponding to zero on the horizontal axis in the figure) of inflatio
output, and the price level are of the form shown in Figure 1. See Wood
(2003, chapter 7) for further discussion of the kind of calculations involv
in this figure. For the sake of simplicity, I abstract from monetary friction
and the numerical results assume calibrated parameter values
, as described in detail in the book manuscript.
The optimal dynamic response to such a disturbance depends in impo
ways on the value of . When (standard Calvo pricing), it is optim
to immediately begin to undo the price increase resulting from such a sh
as soon as the effects of the shock on the aggregate-supply relationship
dissipated (see analysis in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 1999).
commitment to do so restrains price increases in the period of the shock
as a result allows a reduction in the distortions resulting from inflation
that period without requiring a severe contraction of output relative to
2. I have abstracted from a variety of reasons for the desirability of a slightly pos






































Optimal responses to a positive cost-push shock under commitment,
for alternative degrees of inflation inertia









































10 12natural rate. If, instead, is substantially positive, it is optimal to allo
prices to continue to increase, albeit at a slower rate, for a time following
shock, even though it is still optimal to commit to an eventual period
which the inflation rate will undershoot its long-run target value, so that
price level eventually returns to the path that would have been expecte
the absence of the shock. In the limiting case that , the period
undershooting never occurs under an optimal commitment; instead, infla
is only gradually reduced to its long-run target value, and the price le
remains permanently higher.3 Results with some of the same flavour are al
3. It is worth noting, however, that inflation does not remain permanently higher as a r
of such a disturbance under an optimal commitment. It might be thought that
conclusion above—that only the rate of acceleration of inflation matters for welfare w
—would imply that cost-push disturbances should be allowed to permanently a
the rate of inflation as long as inflation is expected to stabilize again atsomerate. But this
is not true under the optimal state-contingent commitment, even when we abstract
monetary frictions. Allowing for monetary frictions provides another reason for the lo






































eralobtained by Steinsson (2002) in the context of a model with backwa
looking rule-of-thumb price-setters similar to the model of Galí and Ger
1999.
Thus far, I have considered the consequences of the value of for the n
of the equilibrium path of inflation that one should seek to bring ab
through monetary policy. One can also consider the consequences o
parameter estimate for the form of an optimal policy rule to which a cen
bank might commit itself to achieve an equilibrium of the kind ju
characterized. A particularly appealing way in which to specify such
policy is to use a target criterion as part of a forecast targeting proced
This is a policy rule under which the central bank is committed to use
policy instrument in whatever way is needed to ensure that the proje
evolution of the economy continues to satisfy the target criterion.
discussed in Woodford (2003, chapter 8), one important aspect of this
of specifying the policy rule is that a characterization of optimal policy c
be given in these terms that is robust to alternative specifications of dist
ance processes.
As shown in Giannoni and Woodford (2003), the optimal target criter
takes a simple form in the cashless limit of the model discussed above
central bank should ensure that in each period,
. (7)
Remember that in this case, the optimal long-run inflation target is given
. This indicates that a short-run departure of the projected inflat
rate from the long-run target should be acceptable to the extent th
(i) reflects automatic inflation as a result of the indexation of non-y
reoptimized prices to the lagged price index; or (ii) is offset by a projec
change in the output gap. Note that (as long as ) neither factor wo
justify a projectedpermanentdeparture from the long-run inflation targe
(here equal to zero). The amount of inflation in the future that can
justified as a result of inflation that has already occurred should fall to z
as one looks far enough ahead, and changes in the output gap s
similarly not be projected to continue indefinitely. The value of matters
the formulation of the target criterion and not simply in determining wh
the feasible inflation/output trade-offs should be at various future horizo
A larger justifies a larger weight on recent past inflation in the calculat
of the acceptable short-run inflation projection (or alternatively, a slow
projected rate of return to the long-run inflation target).
Consequently, we see that a judgment of the value of should have
portant consequences for the characterization of optimal policy in sev
γ
πt γ πt 1––
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uishrespects. Which of the cases examined here should be considered as a
for policy deliberations? Recent empirical literature tends to favo
specifications with large values of . Several authors have even argue
the realism of assuming full indexation . The papers presente
this conference have also tended to support the view that lagged inflati
an important determinant of current inflation, and that this effect should
considered structural, as in the model outlined above with .
Some important questions remain, however, before we can be comfor
making policy on the basis of the conclusions regarding the characte
optimal policy when is large. These questions represent important cav
to the conclusions that I have just described. But they are also reaso
question whether the current empirical literature can answer the ques
about the nature of price-setting that must be settled in order to reach
conclusions about optimal policy.
Many of the studies that argue for the importance of inflation inertia use d
from the 1960s through the 1980s, when policy in both the United States
Canada allowed inflation to drift without an apparent anchor for quite so
time. (Axel Leijonhufvud once characterized this regime as a “random-w
monetary standard.”) But should we really expect inflation inertia
continue to characterize price-setting behaviour to the same extent i
environment of more credible commitment to an inflation target? Even
model of staggered pricing with a large value of accurately descri
pricing dynamics in the period just mentioned, it is not clear that su
indexation to lagged prices is immutable, rather than something that m
well change under an alternative policy commitment—indeed, as somet
that may well be changing already, given the policy changes in the
countries over the past 15 years. After all, it hardly makes sense to think
indexation to a lagged price index should be an institutional necessity
opposed to an adaptation to particular conditions.
Moreover, it is not clear that the evidence offered in favour of the hypothe
of indexation price to actual past inflation could not be equally w
explained by indexation of prices to past expectations regarding the cu
rate of inflation. This is particularly so in the period from 1965 to 198
when there was substantial serial correlation in inflation, and p
expectations of current inflation would reasonably have been hig
correlated with the past rate of inflation. While a large number of rec
empirical studies have estimated the degree of inflation inertia under
assumption that it is the actual past rate of inflation that should affect cur
inflation with a greater or lesser coefficient, none have sought to disting


































But these alternative interpretations of the evidence for inflation ine
would have significantly different consequences for the character of opt
policy. For example, if one supposes that there has recently b
considerable backward-looking indexation, but that it would disappear in
environment of consistently low and stable inflation (or deflation), then o
might argue that it would be more reasonable to commit to a mone
policy rule that leads to optimal outcomes in a world without indexatio
given that such a commitment should lead to an abandonment of indexa
On the other hand, commitment to an optimal rule for an economy w
large would be self-defeating, since it would tend to bring about an en
the conditions under which the rule had been expected to be optimal.
Similarly, if one assumes that prices are automatically indexed betw
occasions of reoptimization, but that the indexation is to past expectation
inflation (perhaps averaged over several prior quarters), one should
expect large distortions to result from a policy of committing to a rap
return of inflation to its normal level (or even to undershoot it) following
cost-push shock. When an increase in inflation associated with s
disturbances is not expected to persist, such an increase should not
much effect on the automatic component of inflation in subsequent quar
Thus, it might be optimal to commit to return inflation to its normal lev
much more rapidly than the simulations in Figure 1 would indicate in
case of a high value of .
Determining which of these interpretations is more realistic should b
topic for further empirical research on inflation dynamics. More theoreti
analysis of the way in which alternative specifications matter for the con
sions that one would draw about optimal policy will also help, by clarifyin
which differences between the specifications are of greatest prac
significance.
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